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POWER AND DUTY: THE LANGUAGE OF THE
WAR POWER
WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY. CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND
ITS AFTERMATH. By John Hart Ely.* Princeton University Press 1993.
244 pp. $24.95.
Peter D. Coffmant
INTRODUCTION
Since the Korean War, voices inside and outside of government
have decried presidentially initiated military action in Haiti, Somalia,
the Persian Gulf, Panama, the Gulf of Sidra, Lebanon, the Dominican
Republic, Indochina, and elsewhere' as encroachments on Congress's
"Power... to declare War."2 Others perceive not presidents actively
usurping legislative power but rather an acquiescent Congress
"sit[ting] back and let[ting] the President act in its place."8 On the
other hand, proponents of presidential power have argued that the
President holds, through practice or necessity, an inherent power to
t Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; A.B., Princeton
University, 1987;J.D., University of Michigan, 1990. The views expressed here are my own,
not the official views of the Justice Department. I gratefully acknowledge Mary Virginia W.
Coffinan, Joseph C. Figini, and James Boyd White for their comments on drafts of this
Review.
* John Hart Ely is the Robert E. Paradise Professor at Stanford Law School, where he
served as Dean from 1982 to 1987.
1 See, e.g., MicHAELJ. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 80 (1990). In regard to
the planned invasion of Haiti, President Clinton was criticized for consulting the United
Nations but "disregard[ing] ... Congress's constitutional role." George F. Will .... Political
Woodstock, WAsH. PoST, Aug. 7, 1994, at C9. Minority members of Congress similarly saw
the invasion as treading on a clearly congressional prerogative. E.g., 140 CONG. REc.
S12,760-61 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1994) (statement of Sen. Specter) ("[T]he Constitution is
unequivocal. It is only the Congress of the United States which has the authority to declare
war.").
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 11.
3 129 CONG. REc. 26,176 (1983) (statement of House Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill,
Jr.) (discussing efficacy of War Powers Resolution in forcing Congress to address presiden-
tial war making); see also 137 CONG. Rxc. S330 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Leahy) ("It would surely be a grave and historic abdication if this great assembly were to
voluntarily forswear its right and its duty to stand and make a choice for war or for
peace."); Michael P. Kelly, Fixing the War Powers, 141 MIL. L. REv. 83, 148 (1993) (noting
"Congress's indifference toward protecting its decisional war powers from the President").
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initiate war in a variety of circumstances, and that an aggressive Con-
gress treads on that right. 4
As Justice Jackson noted in 1951, the boundary dispute between
Congress and the President in foreign affairs is not a recent
development
A century and a half of partisan debate and scholarly speculation
yields no net result but only supplies more or less apt quotations
from respected sources on each side of any question. They largely
cancel each other. And court decisions are indecisive because of
the judicial practice of dealing with the largest questions in the
most narrow way.5
Neither side has moved the dispute substantially closer to a resolution
in succeeding years.6 Congressional proponents continue to rely
upon the specific constitutional grant of the "decisional"7 war power
and the record of debates upon this grant at the Constitutional Con-
vention. 8 Supporters of presidential initiative counter with the textual
grants of the Executive power and the Commander-in-Chief role to
the President, buttressed with realist arguments about the necessity of
4 See W. TAYLOR REVELEY III, WAR POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: WHO
HOLDS THE ARRows AND O0vE BRANCH? 135-69 (1981); ROBERT F. TuRNER, REPEATUNG THE
WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: RESTORING THE RULES OF LAW IN U.S. FOREIGN PoucY 109-69
(1991); SenatorJoseph R. Biden, Jr. &John B. Ritch Im, The War Power at a Constitutional
Impasse: A Joint Decision" Solution, 77 GEo. UJ. 367, 371 n.8 (1988) (citing testimony in
favor of broad presidential war power in The War Power After 200 Years: Congress and the
President at a Constitutional Impasse, Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on War Powers of the
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1989) [hereinafter WarPowers After
200 Years]).
5 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-35 (1952) (Jackson,J.,
concurring) (footnote omitted). Thus, "[a] Hamilton may be matched against a Madison.
Professor Taft is counterbalanced by Theodore Roosevelt. It even seems that President
Taft cancels out Professor TaEL" Id. at 635 n.1 (citations omitted); REvEL , supra note 4, at
9 ("With unsettling frequency the same luminaries (Madison and Hamilton without peer)
have varied their constitutional conclusions with changing times."); see also Biden & Ritch,
supra note 4, at 372 ("[C]ustom and practice... offer a wealth of examples that are cited
to support both sides of the argument [over war powers]."); Donna H. Henry, Note, The
War Powers Resolution.. A Tool for Balancing Power Through Negotiation, 70 VA. L. REv. 1037,
1038 n.7 (1984); Martin Wald, Note, TheFuture of the WarPowers Resolution, 36 STAN. L. REv.
1407, 1409-13 (1984).
6 W. Taylor Reveley III thoroughly sets out the materials of the debate, REvELEY,
supra note 4, at 29-189, and notes: "Most plausible and many quaint allocations of the war
powers between the two branches are supported by one bit of precedent or another." Id. at
8-9. Senator Lloyd Bentsen noted the countervailing arguments in debate over the deploy-
ment of Marines to Lebanon in 1983. 129 CONG. REc. 26,252-53 (1983). The continuing
difficulty this has presented in litigation was noted in one of the cases addressing the Gulf
War. See Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509, 513 (D.D.C. 1990).
7 Kelly, supra note 3, at 118 ("the decisional war powers-the power to authorize any
use of force and to set limits on the nature of that use"). The term "war power" generally
refers to the decisional component.
8 See, e.g., 137 CONG. REc. 5329-30 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Leahy); Biden & Ritch, supra note 4, at 372-81 (discussing intent of the Framers and past
practice preceding Korean War).
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a strong Presidency in the modem world.9 Supreme Court jurispru-
dence has not conclusively placed any of these argumentative gambits
off limits. 10 As a result, ample numbers of intelligent lawyers continue
to hold each position on the basis of "respected [legal] sources on
each side of [the] question.""
The failure of legal analysis to bring effective closure to this issue
leaves the allocation of the war power squarely in the political arena.12
The stresses of the Cold War have resulted in the de facto delegation
of the power to commence combat to the President. Congress, by its
own acquiescence, is involved only to the extent it affirmatively acts to
intervene (as in Nicaragua with the Boland Amendment,' 3 in
Somalia,14 and in Lebanon by agreement with the President')-
which it all too often fails to do (as in the planned invasion of Haiti, 16
9 See, e.g., Eugene V. Rostow, "Once More Unto the Breach". The War Powers Resolution
Revisited, 21 VAL. U. L. REV. 1 (1986); Abraham D. Sofaer, The War Powers Resolution Fifteen
Years Later, 62 TEMP. L. REv. 317 (1989).
10 Justice Scalia emphasized the ad hoc nature of separation of powers jurisprudence
generally in dissenting from the Court's decision upholding Congress's investiture of
prosecutorial functions in a special prosecutor appointed and controlled by the Judiciary.
See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 711 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Further, Reveley
found that "[w] ielding one abstention doctrine or another, judges successfully withstood
an unprecedented surge of opportunity to define [the rights of the President and Con-
gress] in Indochina cases." REVELEY, supra note 4, at 11.
11 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952); see also W.
Michael Reisman, War Powers: The Operational Code of Competence, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
THE U.S. CONSTITUON, 68 (Louis Henkin et al. eds., 1990) ("The original terms of the
Constitution have been invoked by partisans of opposing views, but debate in those terms
has proved inconclusive.") (footnote omitted).
12 See Paul Gewirtz, Realism in Separation of Powers Thinking 30 WM. & MARY L. REv.
343, 346 (1989) ("[T]he relationship and interaction between President and Congress in
the foreign policy areas is shaped more by the respective political power of the two
branches at a particular time than by any charter of legal rights."); Reisman, supra note 11,
at 68-69.
13 See 128 CONG. REc. 29,468-69 (1982); THEODORE DRAPER, A VERY THIN LINE: THE
IRAN-CoNTRA AFFAiRS 18 (1991).
14 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, § 1512, 50 U.S.C. § 1541
note (Supp. V 1993) (entitled "Involvement of Armed Forces in Somalia"); Department of
Defense Appropriations Act of 1994, § 8151, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (Supp. V 1993) (enti-
tled "Duration of Authorization for United States Participation in Multinational Force in
Somalia").
'5 Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (1988); Henry,
supra note 5, at 1050-51 (discussing interbranch compromise over introduction of troops
into Lebanon).
16 Congress did pass a "Sense of Congress" statute as part of the Department of De-
fense Appropriations Act of 1994, stating that those funds "should not be obligated or
expended for United States military operations in Haiti unless ... authorized in advance by
the Congress" or necessary to the country's national security. Sense of Congress on the
Use of Funds for Military Operations in Haiti, Pub. L. No. 103-139, § 8147, 107 Stat. 1474,
1474-75 (1993). Republicans, in September 1994, attempted to pass a binding resolution
prohibiting military action in Haiti, see 140 CONG. REC. S12,677 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1994)
(Statement of Sen. Gregg), but no further congressional action was taken as the planned
invasion loomed imminent. 140 CONG. REc. S12,947 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1994) (statement
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the invasion of Panama, and the no-fly zones over Iraq' 7 and Bosnia-
Herzegovinal)-or is invited to do so by the President (as in Ku-
wait' 9). Thus, post-war practice has the President taking the initiative
until Congress mobilizes to stop him. 20 By refusing to review cases
addressing these questions, at least when less than a majority of both
houses of Congress have petitioned, the courts have let this practice
stand under varying political question, standing, and ripeness ratio-
nales designed to let the political branches sort it out.21
In Indochina,2 2 this pattern led to disaster. Emboldened by con-
gressional expressions of initial consent through the broad language
of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution 23 and later passivity, Presidents John-
son and Nixon accelerated the pace of the nation's military commit-
ment.24 They also held the full extent of that commitment secret
of Sen. Mitchell); see also Elaine Sciolino, Clinton Offering Haitian Leaders Chance to Leave,
N.Y. TimEs, Sept. 15, 1994, at Al, A8 ("Democrats did ... block an effort by Republicans to
force an immediate vote on a non-binding resolution in the Senate to prevent an invasion
of Haiti.").
17 See Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note
(Supp. V 1993) (authorizing military action pursuant to United Nations Resolutions re-
garding Kuwait, but not authorizing military actions in Iraq to protect Kurdish or Shiite
rebels).
18 Although President Clinton repeatedly informed Congress of military acceleration
in Bosnia-Herzegovina by reports "consistent with," but not pursuant to, the War Powers
Resolution, THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: RELEVANT DocUMENTS, REPORTS, CORRESPON-
DENCE, SUBCOMM. ON INT'L SECURITY, INT'L ORGS. AND HuMAN RIGHTS OF THE COMM. ON
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 10Sd Cong., 2d Sess. 248-58, 255-61
(Comm. Print 1994) (reports dated Apr. 13, 1993; July 9, 1993; Oct. 18, 1993; Feb. 17,
1994; Mar. 1, 1994; and Apr. 1994), Congress did not pass a law challenging that exercise
of military power pursuant to the Commander-in-Chief Clause. As part of the Department
of Defense Appropriations Act of 1994, however, Congress passed a "Sense of Congress"
resolution advising that none of the funds appropriated "should" be used for military activ-
ities implementing a peace settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Department of Defense Ap-
propriations Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-139, § 8146, 107 Stat. 1474 (1993).
19 See 137 CONG. REc. H444 (daily ed.Jan. 12, 1991) (statement of Rep. Fascell) (cit-
ing letter from President Bush).
20 Indeed, the State Department's Legal Adviser in the Reagan Administration, Abra-
ham D. Sofaer, has argued that Congress's tendency to "allow( I presidents wide authority
to act to achieve commonly held aims, while at the same time second-guessing, criticizing,
and placing responsibility upon the executive for initiatives that fail" reflects "the constitu-
tionally intended pattern." Sofaer, supra note 9, at 324.
21 See Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990); Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F.
Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987); Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982), affid per
curiam, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984); REvELEm, supra
note 4, at 11 (quoted supra note 10).
22 I use the term "Indochina," as Ely does, in order to include the wars in Cambodia
and Laos, as well as the war in Viemam.
23 Tonkin Gulf Resolution, Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964), repealed by Act of
Jan. 12, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-672, § 12, 84 Stat. 2055 (1971) (authorizing the President to
"take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United
States and to prevent further aggression").
24 JOHN HART ELY, WAR ANn RESPONsIBILrY. CONSTrrUTIONAL L.SSONS OF VIETNAM
AND rrs AF-rEmATH 13 (1993).
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from Congress and the American people while bombing Laos and
Cambodia.25 Although the politics of the war made life hotter for in-
dividual Members of Congress, many chose the easy route of criticiz-
ing fighting which they were "consistently unwilling to end... [and]
in fact quite willing (until the very end) to continue to fuel."26 Con-
gress's evasion of duty and accountability was reflected in a con-
scripted army bereft of a solid front of support at home.27 This history
demonstrates the bloody consequences of the Supreme Court's failure
to act authoritatively to impose clear institutional roles.
I
WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY
John Hart Ely's War and Responsibility seeks to break the stalemate
over constitutional allocation of the war powers. Dean Ely's most di-
rect attempt is a legislative proposal embodied in an appendix to his
book entitled "Toward a War Powers (Combat Authorization) Act
That Works."28 The meat of War and Responsibility, however, sets forth
a representation-reinforcing theory of the war powers that, when
viewed against the backdrop of the war in Indochina, persuasively ar-
gues for the necessity of fixing the decisional war power in Congress,
subject to judicial review to keep it there.
Ely starts with a vigorous and concise argument that the Constitu-
tion has spoken univocally on the "Power . . . [to] declare War,"29
delegating it solely to Congress in "all wars, big or small, 'declared' in
so many words or not."30 In this regard, Ely's views spring from the
25 Id. at 72, 98.
26 Id. at 12.
27 Id. at 4-5.
28 Id. at 115-38 app. The appendix introduces and defends a proposed "Combat Au-
thorization Act" that remedies many of the real and perceived problems with the current
War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1541-1548 (1988). Although a thorough overhaul for
a much-criticized piece of the war powers puzzle, Ely's legislative proposal was previously
published in a 1988 article, John Hart Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted A War Powers Act that
Worked, 88 COLUM. L R-v. 1379 (1988).
29 U.S. CoNsr. art I, § 8, cl. 11.
30 ELY, supra note 24, at 3. The core of Ely's textual and intentional argument lies in
Article I's delegation of the power to "declare War [and to] grant Letters of Marque and
Reprisal" to Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12-16
(empowering Congress to raise, maintain, and regulate army, navy, and militia). Taken
together, in the context of the times, these included both the power to make full, declared
war, and (as was more common even then) limited, undeclared war. ELY, supra note 24, at
66-67, 74; see also ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 56-57 (1973)
(quoting President Buchanan's statement that Congress's power to declare war was "'with-
out limitation'" and extended to "'every species of hostility, however confined or lim-
ited'"); ROBERT J. SPITzER, PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: EXECUTIVE HEGEMONY AT THE
CROSSROADS OF AMERICAN GOVEmENT 151-52 (1993); FRANIas D. WORMUTH & EDWIN B.
FIRmAGE, To CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR: THE WAR POWER OF CONGRESS IN HISTORY AND LAW
53-59 (1986). This reading has been rejected by some who seek to create a space between
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"liberal" tradition of the eighteenth century philosophes who viewed
popular assemblies as a bulwark against the temptation of ill-advised
aggressive war.3' Ely's treatment satisfyingly addresses the Cold War-
era realist critiques, strengthening itself by co-opting and taming them
where possible.3 2
Using the terms and values of a representation-reinforcing consti-
tutional theory, Ely argues that since 1950 Congress and the President
have forged the current allocation by an illicit transfer of the deci-
sional war power. Congress acquiesced to the President on matters of
declared wars and reprisal by emphasizing the formal aspects in eighteenth-century inter-
national law of each. See Eugene V. Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War Powers Act,
50 TEx. L. REv. 833, 850-51 (1972); Rostow, supra note 9, at 6-9. Ely does not delve deeply
into this debate. However, this counter-reading is treated fully and convincingly rejected
in Charles A. Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81
YALE L.J. 672, 697 (1972); see also EDWARD KEYNES, UNDECLARED WAR: TWILIGHT ZONE OF
CONSTTUTONAL PowER 31-40 (1982) (discussing drafting of war clauses at Constitutional
Convention); WoiaMutH & FIRmAGE, supra at 17-18; Raoul Berger, War, Foreign Affairs, and
Executive Secrecy, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 309, 318-23 (1977); Charles A. Lofgren, On War-Makin
Original Intent, and Ultra-Whiggry, 21 VAt. U. L. REv. 54, 54-58 (1986). Nonetheless, Profes-
sor Lofgren stresses that "one cannot pretend that the matter is beyond all doubt," a
charge to which Ely's peremptory analysis is liable. Lofgren, supra, at 697; see also Louis
H _KrN, CONSmTruTnONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN ArnAsus 26-27 (1990); GregoryJ.
Sidak, ToDedare War, 41 DuKE L.J. 27, 35 (1991) (rejecting Ely's position as "too tall" and
using snippets from Lofgren in support). On the other hand, one can list numerous occa-
sions throughout the life of the republic in which presidents can be inferred to have ac-
knowledged by their actions an exclusively congressional war power. See ANN VAN WYNEN
THOMAS & A. J. THOMAS, JR., THE WAR-MAING POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT 31-35 (1982);
WORMUTH & FIRMAGE, supra, at 75-85. ContraTuiRmNR, supra note 4, at 56-61; Rostow, supra,
at 851 (noting thatJefferson, Madison, and Hamilton all retreated from their initial con-
tentions that the President was powerless to initiate hostilities). The persistence of this
debate demonstrates the pliability of the traditional materials.
Ely buttresses his conclusions with policy arguments encompassing both the Framers'
hatred of war (especially the tyranny of an individual Executive's wars) and the common-
sense contention that if we must have war, it should be decided by the full representatives
of the Nation (a) in order to ensure its necessity, (b) to serve democracy generally by
ensuring that the body closest to the people is on board, and (c) to enlist the deepest grass-
roots support. The onset of war in Indochina, as Ely stresses, evidenced a fatal lack of
deliberation, public debate, and popular support. ELY, supra note 24, at 4-5.
31 See KEYNES, supra note 30, at 18-22; Rostow, supra note 9, at 40 (discussing Whiggish
view of war powers); Note, Realism, Liberalism, and the War Powers Resolution, 102 HARV. L
REV. 637, 640-42 (1989).
32 For example, Ely admits the force of the realist position that in a nuclear age one
person, rather than a deliberative body, must be alone at the center of the network of
intelligence that assesses the threat, as well as at the controls of our response. ELY, supra
note 24, at 6. Rather than letting that exception open the floodgates, however, Ely states
his concession as a federal analogue to the states' constitutionally reserved power to "repel
sudden attacks." Id. That textual grounding, and the emergency rationale underlying it,
provides the criteria for delimiting the exception. The President's power extends only to
situations requiring an immediate response where accompanied by "swift and full disclo-
sure to the legislature and [in which hostilities] subside[ ] if [Congress] do[es] not ap-
prove." Id. at 7. Since "[i]f troops and equipment can be dispatched to the front, a
cabinet officer can surely be dispatched to Capitol Hill (even faster, one would suppose),"
id. at 144 n.29, this provides a potentially effective limitation.
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war to avoid the "frightening" accountability that comes with making
the wrenching decisions of war and peace.33 Such congressional abdi-
cation, Ely believes, has deprived the public of a vital check on execu-
tive war, of the central forum for expressing its will and venting
conflicting views, and of the opportunity to hold Members of Con-
gress accountable for their decisions.3 Given this political failure, Ely
calls upon the courts to intervene and reestablish the constitutional
equilibrium. Specifically, Ely proposes that the Judiciary accept juris-
diction in war powers cases and remand decisions regarding the pro-
priety of wars, large or small, to Congress where they belong.35 Only
in a congressional forum can the triple benefits of a check on presi-
dential power; public, adversarial debate; and full accountability be
achieved. That insight generates both the rationale for judicial in-
volvement and the criteria for limiting the courts' role.
This Review describes and assesses Ely's view of the war power.
Section II discusses how War and Responsibility draws strength from the
general, process-oriented theory of judicial review that Ely articulated
in the influential Democracy and Distrust: A Theory ofJudicial Review.36
Section III analyzes the rhetoric carrying Ely's theory. By turning em-
phasis away from the terms of the stalemate to deeper constitutional
concepts, Ely offers and demonstrates the tools for a richer, more pro-
ductive discussion of the war power.
II
A REPRESENTATION-REINFORCING THEORY OF WAR POWERS
Modem political realities make Ely's stated task of reinjecting
meaningful congressional participation into war powers decisions over
the inertia of a quiescent Congress a challenging one. Ely's solution
relies on judicial review to determine whether Congress has fulfilled
its role in the constitutionally (or legislatively) prescribed debate:
[T]he judiciary is the most politically insulated branch of our gov-
ernment. But if the courts' relative insulation from the democratic
process suggests that it's no business of theirs to decide what wars
we fight, it does situate them uniquely well to police malfunctions in
that process .... 37
33 Id. at ix.
34 Id. at 4.
35 Id. at 54.
36 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRusr: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEWv (1980)
[hereinafter ELY, DEMOCRACY AmD DISTRUST]. Democracy and Distr ut won the triennial Or-
der of the Coif award for 1980 to 1982 as the best book in any field of law. A symposium
held on the tenth anniversary of its publication reviewed its lasting impact. Symposium on
Democracy and Distrust: Ten Years Later, 77 VA. L. REv. 631 (1991).
37 ELY, supra note 24, at 54. Not all scholars agree that the Judiciary's role should be
cabined to this procedural question:
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Framing the question and solution in terms of process-as op-
posed to the substance of wise governance38-evinces the same effort
to define substance in terms of procedure that animates Ely's general
theory of judicial review in Democracy and Distrust.3 9 The strength that
Ely's proposal draws from that theory distinguishes War and Responsi-
bility from prior calls for judicial review of war power decisions.40
A. Process Theory
Drawing upon footnote four of Carolene Products,4' Ely seeks in
Democracy and Distrust to ground the judicial protection of minority
rights in something other than interpretivism and the shifting sands
of judges' values. The book succeeds by integrating within a demo-
cratic structure majoritarian impulses and solicitude for minority
rights. Ely charts a path based on an extended exposition of howjudi-
cial attention to "process writ large-with ensuring broad participa-
tion in the processes and distributions of government"42-offers a
value-neutral basis for protecting the rights of minorities.43
If I have a quibble with Ely, it is this: he never mentions the constitutional
relevance of international law to war making, and thus ignores the Consti-
tution's Supremacy Clause and, in turn, the more substantive obligation to
refrain from aggressive war. IfI read Ely correctly, he would have us believe
that if Congress properly authorized the President to invade Mexico, the
action would then be constitutional. I believe that the Constitution incor-
porates duly ratified treaties, including the United Nations Charter, into its
framework of constraint, and that, in some sense, this mandate to respect
international law is even less observed and understood than is the duty of
Congress to authorize a war for it to be valid.
Richard Falk, Whose WarPowers?, PRINCErON ALUMNI WIY., Mar. 9, 1994, at 19, 20 (review-
ing JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPoNsiBiLrry. CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND
ITS AFrERMATH (1993)). The courts, however, eschew any substantive role. See, e.g., Ange
v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509, 513 (D.D.C. 1990).
S8 An example of "wise governance" includes the predetermined goal of avoiding all
wars as "'the greatest of national calamities.'" ELY, supra note 24, at 3 (quoting JAMES
MADISON, 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 316 (M. Farrand ed.,
1911)); see also 129 CONG. REc. 26,386 (1983) (excerpt from THOMAS F. EAGLETON, WAR
AND PRESmENTIAL PowER: A CHRONICLE OF CONGRESSIONAL SURRENDER 223 (1974) (quoting
Justice Story's characterization of war as "'calamitous'")); KEYNES, supra note 30, at 76
("[T]he courts merely determine whether the political departments have taken the consti-
tutionally prescribed action necessary to exercise the discretionary power conferred.").
39 Ely makes this connection in a note. ELY, supra note 24, at 140 n.10; cf John Hart
Ely, Another Such Vctoy: Constitutional Theory and Practice in a World Where Courts Are No
Different From Legislatures, 77 VA. L. REv. 833, 878-79 (1991) ("[Tihe courts can play a useful
role in forcing Congress to perform its constitutionally-contemplated functions. Helping
devise such judicial Congress-prodding doctrines thus seems to me the most productive
use that can currently be made of a constitutional scholar's time; at any rate it's how I've
been spending mine lately.").
40 Such as GLENNON, supra note 1, at 111-13, 117-18.
41 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
42 ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 36, at 87.
43 This version of the procedural basis of rights has been characterized as "running
from process to rights." Lawrence G. Sager, Constitutional Triage, 81 CoLUM. L. REv. 707, 717
(1981) (reviewingJESSE H. CHOPERJUDiciAL REvIEw AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS
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Ely's solution takes the form of
a representation-reinforcing approach to judicial review, [that,] un-
like its rival value-protecting approach, is not inconsistent with, but
on the contrary (and quite by design) entirely supportive of, the
underlying premises of the American system of representative
democracy.44
Ely portrays the subjugation of minority rights by the political
branches as breakdowns in the American political and constitutional
process:
The approach to constitutional adjudication recommended here is
akin to what might be called an "antitrust" as opposed to a "regula-
tory" orientation to economic affairs-rather than dictate substan-
tive results it intervenes only when the "market," in our case the
political market, is systemically malfunctioning.4 5
This approach casts the judiciary as playground umpire, dusting off
the plate when the minority comes to bat and making sure that sides
are picked fairly and everyone gets to play. With that level playing
field, and the commonality of interests inherent in participating in
the same game, the players' skill, not the umpire, decides the score.46
Minority and majority alike should feel a part of a participational en-
terprise, whether ultimately on the winning or losing side.
This "representation-reinforcing approach to judicial review" em-
phasizes leaving the burden of articulating substantive values on the
political branches elected for that purpose. The interplay of this con-
cern with Ely's larger theory is illustrated by his use of a quotation
(1980)). Sager explains, "There are no applicable claims of right that are understood as
external to the political process, and it is defects in that process that are seen as the source
of rights. The legitimate role of the judiciary, then, lies in identifying and enforcing these
process-based, process-correcting rights." Id. In vindicating these rights, therefore, "the
claim is that the majoritarian process is being cured or purified, not defeated." Id. This
approach contrasts with one that posits rights existing in inevitable opposition to the polit-
ical process. Id. Ely recaps this "legal process school" of thought in Ely, supra note 39, at
833 n.4.
44 ELY, DEMOcRAGY AND DISTRUST, suPra note 36, at 88.
45 Id. at 102-03. As Ely's antitrust analogy reveals, politics is in itself a regulated mar-
ket that does not tolerate monopolies, from whatever genesis, and may force dealing be-
tween parties that would prefer to be left apart. The latter is inherent in Ely's updated
theory of "virtual representation," which ties "the interests of those without political power
to the interests of those with it." Id. at 83. This concept undergirds numerous American
constitutional structures. By keeping the majority from distributing benefits and burdens
along lines that single out powerless groups, this concept ensures that the majority virtually
represents the minority. Id. at 100-01. Thus, for example, states may not deny privileges
and immunities to residents of other states, and states may not single out corporations
chartered in other states for special taxes for their in-state business. Id. at 83-87.
46 See id. at 103; see also Frederick Schauer, The Caltdus of Distrust, 77 VA. L RxV. 653
(1991) (discussing the implicit distrust of the courts as a source of substantive policy
wisdom).
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from Alexander Bickel, discussing his "career-long quest for a satisfac-
tory approach to constitutional adjudication":
The search must be for a function ... which is peculiarly suited to
the capabilities of the courts; which will not likely be performed
elsewhere if the courts do not assume it; which can be so exercised
as to be acceptable in a society that generally shares Judge Hand's
satisfaction in a "sense of common venture"; which will be effective
when needed; and whose discharge by the courts will not lower the
quality of the other departments' performance by denuding them
of the dignity and burden of their own responsibility.47
B. War Powers and the Political Market
The challenge taken up in War and Responsibility is to cure a sys-
temic failure of the political market in the war powers area while re-
specting the roles of all three branches. Dean Ely argues that
Congress-the institution designated to represent the people's inter-
ests in this decision-is systematically failing to enter the political
"market" and make decisions upon which its members can be judged
at the polls. 48 Although the accountability of the President creates a
different political "market" (including his own accountability to the
electorate), it is not the market created by the Constitution for the
decisional war power.49 Moreover, the vague allocation of roles
forged in the political arena allows the two branches to play a shell
game in which members of Congress claim that it is the President's
war50 and the President claims that Congress has acquiesced through
silence or ambivalent appropriations measures. 5' As a result, the pub-
lic is left to wonder whether or not their individual legislators really
are responsible for the war.
Ely charges the courts with fixing the responsibility for initiating
war clearly on Congress in order to ensure that the electorate has a
clear opportunity to hold their representatives responsible on issues
of war and peace.52 This theory of judicial review does not include a
substantive judicial determination of which wars are appropriate. 53
47 ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRusT, supra note 36, at 103-04 (quoting ALEXANDER M.
BicKF, THE LEAsr DANGEROUS BRANCH 24 (1962)).
48 ELY, supra note 24, at 59. Ely expressed the same view in regard to Congress' dele-
gation of other legislative functions in Democracy and Distrust. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIS-
TRusT, supra note 36, at 131-34.
49 See ELY, supra note 24, at 3-10 (decisional war power is devolved unequivocally on
Congress alone).
50 Id. at 53.
51 Id. at 32-46.
52 Id. at 54-56.
53 At least one commentator suggests international law could provide such standards.
See Falk, supra note 37, at 20 (quoted supra note 37). CompareJonathan A. Bush, The Bind-
ing of Guliver Congress and Courts in an Era of Presidential Warmaking, 80 VA. L. REv. 1723,
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Therefore, Ely's theory is not susceptible to the majoritarian charge
that it substitutes platonic guardians for elected representatives. In-
stead, the courts are invoked only to "police malfunctions in [the
democratic] process" itself.5 4
This grounding of the court's role in the protection of an ac-
countable, democratic process distinguishes Ely's proposal. While
many proponents of congressional power have called on the courts to
vindicate a primary congressional role, they do so primarily for tex-
tual, historical, and other policy reasons.55 Although he repeats many
of these arguments in summary,56 Ely's focus on how judicial review
can safeguard the public's ability to hold their representatives respon-
sible for decisions on war adds an important analytic principle.
This principle, however, is not foreign to constitutional jurispru-
dence. War and Responsibility's emphasis upon Congress's duty to exer-
cise the power granted it by the Constitution recalls the
nondelegation doctrine of the 1930s. That doctrine, developed in re-
gard to Congress's constitutionally granted "legislative" power, holds
that "Congress manifestly is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to
others the essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested."57
Chief Justice Rehnquist has explained that the rationale of the doc-
trine prevents Congress from "simply abdicat[ing] its responsibility for
the making of a fundamental and most difficult policy choice ...
[that] must be made by the elected representatives of the people, not
by nonelected officials in the Executive Branch."58 In other words,
members of Congress should not be able to vitiate the electorate's
right to hold them accountable for the "'hard policy choices' properly
the task of the legislature"59 by shunting those questions to the Execu-
tive Branch. The decision to go to war is both the most difficult of
choices as well as one specifically committed to Congress.
1756-70 (1994) (book review) (raising possibility that Congress could by statute specifically
apply international law regarding aggressive war to presidentially initiated hostilities, but
rejecting that approach as judicially unworkable).
54 ELY, supra note 24, at 54.
55 See GLENNoN, supra note 1, at 71-122; HENMN, supra note 30, at 78 (discussing "com-
mitment to constitutionalism" which undergirds judicial review in foreign affairs); cf Ber-
ger, supra note 30, at 318-23 (addressing intent of the Framers); Harold H. Koh, Why the
President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE LJ.
1255, 1326-35 (1988) (urging greater congressional expertise and involvement in foreign
affairs in order to avoid excesses such as the policies underlying the Iran-contra affairs);
HAROLD H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURrIY CoNsTrrrToN: SHARING POWER AFrER THE IRAN-
CONTRA AFFAIR 166-81 (1990) (same).
56 ELY, supra note 24, at 3-11.
57 Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935); accord A.LA Schecter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935).
58 American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 547 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
59 Id. at 543 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Industrial Union Dep't v. American
Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 671 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment)).
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Unfortunately, as Ely recognizes, 60 the nondelegation doctrine
has been "'virtually abandoned"' by the Supreme Court because the
administrative state that has flourished since the 1930s "could not op-
erate without" broad delegations. 61 This is especially true of delega-
tions to the President in foreign affairs, 62 as then Assistant Attorney
General William H. Rehnquist argued of the Tonkin Gulf Resolu-
tion. 63 Indeed, even the most strident proponents of a strictly con-
gressional war power acknowledge that the courts have never applied
the doctrine to presidential military ventures, including the war in
Indochina.64
Nonetheless, the basic principle of the delegation doctrine, that
Congress should not sidestep democratic accountability for its most
serious responsibilities, remains available if not absolute. First,
although broad delegation of general legislative power appears to be
tolerated, it is not clear that the courts should approve similar delega-
tions of specific powers, such as the power to declare war, or the
power to impeach. 65 Ely's extended illustration of how Congress's ab-
dication of its duty to deliberate and vote on the Indochina War frus-
trated accountability argues powerfully that decisions on war are also
different from normal, delegable legislative functions.66 Second, pres-
idential assumption of Congress's war power does not reflect an af-
firmative congressional delegation. Even standardless statutory
delegations demonstrate some exercise of legislative functions upon
which individual members of Congress can be judged. A duty for-
saken by silent acquiescence, however, is more difficult for the electo-
60 ELY, supra note 24, at 23-24.
61 1 KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TPaFTIsE § 3:2 (2d ed. 1978) (quoting
FPC v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345, 352-53 (1974)). For a general discussion of
the nondelegation doctrine and its potential viability, see David Schoenbrod, The Delegation
Doctrine: Could the Court Give It Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1223 (1985).
62 ELY, supra note 24, at 24 (discussing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)); see also SprrzER, supra note 30, at 144-45.
63 WoRmuTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 30, at 206.
64 Id. at 213-14 (discussing Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042-43 (2d Cir. 1971));
see also Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1971). The exception is Mora v.
McNamara, 389 U.S 934 (1967), in which the dissent from a denial of certiorari in a case
challenging the legality of the Vietnam War questioned whether the Tonkin Gulf Resolu-
tion sufficed to provide authorization to the Executive in the absence of a declaration of
war. Id. at 935 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Despite these and the other problems noted
above, Professors Wormuth and Firmage contend that the nondelegation doctrine as set
forth in Schecter Poultry and Panama Refining is not only alive and well, but that it applies
fully to foreign affairs. WoasurH & FIRMAGE, supra note 30, at 206-14; see also LwaREcE R.
VELVEL, UNDECLARD WAR AND CIVIL DISOBEDiENCE 75-84 (1970) (contending that the Ton-
kin Gulf Resolution was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power). As set forth
below, Ely maintains his credibility by appealing to the principle behind that doctrine
rather than joining the hopeless attempt to unring its death knell and make it legally bind-
ing in the unlikely area of war powers. See supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
65 DAVIS, supra note 61, § 3:4.
66 ELY, supra note 24, at 12-46.
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rate to assess. Despite the death of nondelegation as a doctrine, its
underpinnings demonstrate the depth of accountability as a touch-
stone for judicial intervention.
C. Practical and Theoretical Problems
Despite the foregoing, Ely's representation-reinforcing theory of
war powers is still subject to two complaints. First, on a theoretical
level, it is not clear that Congress's frequent abdication reflects a sys-
temic political breakdown of the sort supporting judicial intervention
in Democracy and Distrust. Specifically, unlike a purely majoritarian sys-
tem's tendency to scapegoat minorities and box them permanently
out of both the process and the spoils, Congress's failures in war pow-
ers are largely of the will, not the system. Absent a determined secret
usurpation such as the Executive pursued in Laos or the Contra war,67
Congress's choice to focus myopically on local, domestic issues is re-
viewable at the polls.
By contrast, a true market failure by definition precludes such
self-correction. For example, a congressional choice to seize the prop-
erty of an individual on behalf of the majority presumably will be vali-
dated electorally by the benefitted majority.68 Similarly, successful
disenfranchisement, whether direct or through gerrymandering, logi-
cally insulates itself from correction at the polls.69 This is a systemic,
procedural breakdown requiring help from outside the democratic
system. It simply cannot fix itself.
67 Such covert actions constitute potentially impeachable crimes that the system can
address. As Congressman William Hungate put it: "'It's kind of hard to live with yourself
when you impeach a guy for tapping telephones and not for making war without authoriza-
tion.'" ELY, supra note 24, at 104 (citation omitted); see also id. at 95-97 (discussing the war
in Laos as an impeachable offense). This sentiment coincides with the purpose of im-
peachment to protect the public from "'the misconduct of public men, or, in other words,
from the abuse or violation of some public trust.'" JOHN P, La.ovIrz, PRESIDENTIAL IM-
PEACHMENT 29 (1978) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 65 (Alexander Hamilton)); see also
RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 75 (1973) (tracing consti-
tutional language to debates in the Constitutional Convention); PETER C. HOFER & N.E.H.
HULL, IMPEACHMENT IN AMERIcA, 1635-1805, at 118 (1984) (maintaining that "corrupt mo-
tive" sufficed for American founders); OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE,
LEGAL ASPECTS OF IMPEACHMENT: AN OVERVIEW 15-16 (1974) (discussing views of state rati-
fication conventions). "Impeachments in the United States,James Wilson wrote soon after
the Constitution was ratified, 'are confined to political characters, to political crimes and
misdemeanors, and to political punishment.'" LABovrrz, supra, at 27 (citation omitted).
Deliberate misuse of the President's political authority as Commander-in-Chief, accompa-
nied by deliberate concealment, calls for the political punishment of impeachment. But see
CHARLES L. BLACK, IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK 44 (1974) ("[T]here is often some fairly
plausible claim of authorization in the particular case, and where experts disagree onjusti-
fication, it is hard to find clear and wanton abuse of power.").
68 See ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 36, at 97-98.
69 Id. at 117 (citing Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627-28
(1969)).
1248 [Vol. 80:1236
POWER AND DUTY
If, however, the electorate wants a Congress that cares about for-
eign affairs, including its bloodiest manifestation, there is no struc-
tural or theoretical impediment to their electing one. Congress need
not take seriously a "halftime pep-talk imploring that body to pull up
its socks and reclaim its rightful authority";70 the electorate can apply
the incentive. Indeed, it is presumably the electoral incentive to con-
centrate on domestic matters to which the faint-hearted in Congress
respond in choosing to reserve the option of cheering or booing as
the war progresses. Also, an outside opponent could excoriate a legis-
lator, even one trying to end a war, for years of quiet acquiescence. If
a defeat in the next election is probable, it should awaken the legisla-
tor to her duty to deliberate at the outset. Congress's choice to forego
its responsibility, therefore, appears a legitimate move within a demo-
cratic system, theoretically allowing for correction by that system.
Dean Ely's discussion of the Indochina War, however, demon-
strates that the public has consistently failed to apply that electoral
discipline, and that members of Congress know it.71 Thus, congress-
men who sought to end a war over which they had declined to deliber-
ate at inception were frequently rewarded by re-election despite
earlier failures of leadership.72 Despite the possibility of accountabil-
ity for inaction, the probability remains so low as to be practically in-
distinguishable from a "true" malfunction in the process itself.
Members of Congress have gotten the message that failing to address
the wisdom of presidentially proposed, planned, or initiated hostilities
does not result in voter backlash, whereas a vote against a popular war,
or in support of what becomes an unpopular war, can. 73 This consti-
tutes a de facto failure of the political market and calls for judicial
intervention.
70 ELY, supra note 24, at 52. A thorough exhortation, with concrete suggestions for
internal changes designed to centralize expertise on national security issues within Con-
gress, is contained in Koh, supra note 55, at 1326-35.
71 E.g., ELY, supra note 24, at 19, 49, 59 (quoting Thomas Eagleton on Congress's
preference to avoid difficult decisions over foreign affairs).
72 See ELY, supra note 24, at 17-23 (discussing Senator Fulbright's record of "voting
with the administration forces" at the outset only to later take up the mantle of resistance).
Ironically, in 1961 Senator Fulbright decried the "localism and parochialism" of Congress:
At no point in his rise to powerful office does the typically successful politi-
cian find it imperative to school himself in the requirements and problems
of foreign policy. Indeed his pre-occupation with local matters and with
political machinery is virtually bound to prevent him from acquiring any
breadth or depth of knowledge in the field of foreign affairs.
J. William Fulbright, American Foreign Policy in the 20th Century Under an 18th-Century Constitu-
tion, 47 CoRNw.L L.Q. 1, 6 (1961).
73 Kelly, supra note 3, at 147 ("Voters simply do not elect members of Congress based
on their position regarding the war powers or even foreign relations.... In modern times,
national security and foreign relations are complex and politically hazardous. Congress
generally is content to leave that responsibility with the President.").
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Second, critics may oppose Ely's proposal because, as a practical
matter, it may not always be possible to limit judicial involvement to a
simple remand to Congress, with the President automatically enjoined
from commencing or continuing hostilities until Congress acts. Ely's
vision of a clear, manageable judicial remedy departs sharply from
Professor Bickel's pessimistic assessment of the effect of ajudicial de-
cision ending the Vietnam War as unconstitutional:
For my part, I think the Court has been wise to exercise its discre-
don so as to avoid passing on the constitutionality of the war.... If
the Court were to hold the war unconstitutional, the effect would
not be to cause Congress to spring into action. The effect would be
to make it less likely than otherwise that Congress will assume its
responsibility, now and in the future. There would be sighs of relief
on Capitol Hill to have had the responsibility taken off Congress'
shoulders; and, in the future, likely as not, Congress would continue
to tolerate presidential initiatives and wait for the Supreme Court to
hold them unconstitutional. 74
Under Ely's program too, we can ask whether Congress would not fre-
quently decline to act upon the remand, preferring to let the courts
take the lead in confronting the President and dealing with the poten-
tially messy business of supervising a reluctant withdrawal.
Ely would distinguish his proposal by its timing; it is designed to
halt the march to a presidential war, not to end a full-fledged war like
the Indochina War in 1971.75 Nonetheless, Professor Bickel's insight
retains substantial force for two reasons. First, it is often hard to see
the results of sabre rattling without the benefit of hindsight. Second,
even ajudicial delay of a few days or weeks (which seems a minimum
before a court could decide a matter of this magnitude and novelty)
plus even a short delay for a remand to Congress, would put the
courts in the position of ordering, and possibly overseeing, a with-
drawal if the President resists. Moreover, the judicial remand could
practically turn out to be no different from an injunction should Con-
gress routinely fail to act.
Ely addresses these problems in an enormous endnote,7 6 and
concludes that if Congress is paralyzed and the President is defiant of
the courts, "we will all be in very deep water, and certainly will have
passed the point where judicial action is very relevant."77 At its least, a
judicial remand deprives individual legislators of the cover story that
they did not really acquiesce in the ensuing war. At its greatest, it calls
74 Alexander M. Bickel, Congress, the President and the Power to Wage War, 48 GHI.-KNT
L. REv. 131, 144-45 (1971).
75 ELY, supra note 24, at 237 n.61 (distinguishing judicial remand to Congress from
later enforcement orders should the President resist).
76 Id. at 183 n.86.
77 Id. at 237 n.61.
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upon the powerful rhetorical platform of the judicial opinion to mo-
bilize the public and prod Congress.78
D. Unforeseen Implications for the Commander-in-Chief
Function
Finally, although Ely does not discuss it, identification of account-
ability as the touchstone of war-powers allocation sheds light on an-
other potential constitutional imbalance. Judicial insistence on a
formal, self-conscious congressional exercise of the decisional war
power minimizes the opportunity for Congress to micro manage the
President's exercise of the operational war power 79 embodied in his
functions as Commander-in-Chief.80 An incidental or implied author-
ization of hostilities reflects a fluid delineation of roles. This allows
the congressional committees a foothold to kibitz on strategy through
hearings with administration and military officials and allows Congress
to offer advice against the backdrop of explicit or implicit threats to
legislate how the war is conducted. If the hostilities in question consti-
tute a war, however, the Constitution commits responsibility for con-
ducting it to the President just as clearly as it devolves the
responsibility to begin war on Congress.81 Congressional meddling in
the President's duties provides the President an excuse for failure,82
but does. not pin any responsibility firmly on individual legislators.
Thus, it clouds the question of whom the public can hold accountable
for the conduct of the war. This runs afoul of Ely's accountability
principle as surely as does unfettered presidential war making.
78 See id. at 130-31.
79 Congressional and presidential war powers can be distinguished as "decisional" and
"operational." Kelly, supra note 3, at 113-21. Thus, "[w]hile the zenith of congressional
power is during the decisional phase, the apex of the President's power is during the oper-
ational phase." Id. at 163; see alsoJ. Terry Emerson, Making War Without a Declaration, 17J.
OF LEGIS. 23, 33 (1990); GEORGE SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER AND WORLD AFFAIRS
71 (1919) (distinguishing "the power to declare and the power to wage war").
80 Cf. W. Taylor Reveley II, Congressional Practice: An Overiew and Case Histories, in
CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT, AND FOREIGN POLCY 129 (Steven P. Soper ed., 1984) (discussing
the "new congressional activism"); Robert F. Turner, The Constitution and the Iran-Contra
Affair: Was Congress the Real Lawbreaker?, 11 HousTONJ. INT'L L. 83, 122-23 (1988) (arguing
that Congress has arrogated presidential power by seeking to "micromanage foreign affairs
in the post-Vietnam era").
81 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. In debating Congress's role in authorizing the
presence of Marines in Lebanon in 1983, Senator Lloyd Bentsen stressed this division of
roles: "Congress is not trying to run a war. That is the sole responsibility of the Executive."
129 CONG. REC. 26,252 (1983). Similarly, ChiefJustice Salmon Chase opined in 1866 that
"Congress cannot direct the conduct of campaigns." Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2,
139 (1866) (Chase, CJ., concurring).
82 See, e.g., TURNER, supra note 4, at 31-33 (arguing that congressional interference,
through the Cooper-Church Amendment, Act ofJuly 1, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-52, § 108, 87
Stat. 130, 134 (1973), with the Nixon Administration's campaign of bombing North Viet-
nam while offering negotiations encouraged Hanoi to further resistance).
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Within the War Powers Resolution lurks a similar opportunity for
Congress to interfere with the functions of the Commander-in-
Chief.83 The Resolution states in pertinent part
Authority to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities
... shall not be inferred-
(1) from any provision of law.., unless such provision ... states
that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization
within the meaning of this chapter.84
Although this rule of construction is primarily a limit on the Pres-
ident's ability to manufacture congressional consent from inconclu-
sive legislative acts, it also allows Congress to participate in a war
without taking the dose of accountability that such action should re-
quire. That is, under the Resolution, Congress can "fund warfare
without actually taking responsibility for war itself," retaining the right
to "backseat drive[ ]"85 through debates and appropriations, pressing
or easing the accelerator without taking a stand on whether to start
down that road.8 6 The flexibility of Ely's focus on accountability to
protect both congressional and presidential areas of responsibility at-
tests to its potential to serve as a guiding principle in the debate over
war powers, and perhaps in separation of powers disputes generally.
83 The most frequently heard criticism of the War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C.
§ 1547(a) (1988), of course, emanates from congressional partisans who argue that its 60-
to-90 day grace period unlawfully "'creates a legal base for the continuing claims of virtu-
ally untrammeled Presidential authority to take the Nation to war without a prior congres-
sional declaration.'" EAGOLoN, supra note 38, at 208 (quoting his own comments on the
floor of the Senate in opposition to the War Powers Resolution as reported from the Con-
ference Committee); see also Bush, supra note 53, at 1749 & n.143 (discussing criticism of
the statutory grace period).
84 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a) (1988). Michael Glennon proposes amending the War Powers
Resolution to strengthen this provision. GLENNON, supra note 1, at 117.
85 George S. Swan, Presidential Undeclared Warmaking and Functionalist Theory: Dellums
v. Bush and Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 22 CAL. W. ITr'L LJ. 75, 116 (1991-92);
see also Dick Cheney, Congressional Overreaching in Foreign Policy, in FOREIGN POLCY AND THE
CONSTrUTON 101, 119-20 (Robert A. Goldwin & Robert A. Licht eds., 1990) ("Congress
typically tries to avoid responsibility for a clear decision, avoids confrontation when presi-
dents refuse to invoke the [War Powers Resolution's] terms, and prefers instead to praise
successful presidential actions or criticize unsuccessful ones after the fact."); Edmund S.
Muskie, The Reins of Libert)-Congress, the President, and American Security, in FOREIGN POLICY
AND THE CONSTITUrION, supra, at 90-91 (comparing caricatures of a "seriously misguided
president," against "Congress as a quarrelsome throng of 535 backseat drivers-local politi-
cians who imagine themselves the secretary of state").
86 The respective roles of Congress and the President have been aptly analogized to
those of someone who decides to commence an ocean trip, and the captain, who guides
the ship once the trip is begun. GLEmNON, supra note 1, at 85 & n.78 (quoting WarPowers
Legislation: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 504
(1971)).
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A NEW LANGUAGE FOR WAR POWERS
Critics acclaim both Democracy and Distrust and War and Responsi-
bility as "written in a relaxed, almost colloquial, but always handsome
prose"87 remarkably "readable... and somehow manag[ing] humor
and a kind of conversational elegance."" Recently, the intelligent hu-
mor of Ely's style has been compared to that of Joseph Heller.8 9 Ely's
writing style and rhetoric, however, serve much more than to coat in
elegance what might otherwise be a dry pill. In War and Responsibility,
Ely's method of argumentation breaks down the language90 structur-
ing the traditional debates over the war power, remaking it and recast-
ing the constitutional players. Like Ely's stress on accountability, this
reconstitution of the language of the argument presents an alternative
to the stalemated terms of the current war power debate.
A. The Ely We Know: The Ideal Reader and the Model Author
in Democracy and Distrust
The accessible, candid prose for which Ely is best known is most
pronounced in Democracy and Distrust, which demonstrates a remarka-
ble synergy of substance and form.9' To convey the character of Ely's
voice, I will borrow and edit a quotation from a leading student of
legal rhetoric: "As I ... read through it I have [a] sense of the kind of
life one associates with the reading of literary texts: [a] sense of a
mind responding and learning, [a] sense of puzzle and illumination,
. [a] sense indeed of the presence of another mind with whom the
87 Michael Boudin, Book Review, 67 VA. L. Rv. 1251, 1254 (1981) (reviewing ELY, DE-
MOCRACY AND DIS-RusT, supra note 86); see also Eric M. Freedman, Book Review, 48 BROOa.
L. REV. 391 (1982) ("Professor Ely's exposition of constitutional theory is both deceptively
simple... and satisfyingly rich...."); Richard A. Posner, Democracy and Ditrust Revisited, 77
VA. L. REv. 641, 642 (1991) ("an uncommonly lucid and unaffected prose style").
88 Falk, supra note 37, at 19.
89 Philip Bobbitt, WarPowers: An Essay on John Hart Ely's War and Responsibility: Con-
stitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its Aftermath, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1364, 1364, 1400 n.110
(1994).
90 I use the term "language" broadly to encompass the words of value to which a
speaker ran turn to make, in this case, legal claims of authority and persuasion. SeeJAMES
BOYD WHrrE, WHEN WoRDs LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND RECONST1TUTIONS
OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COMMUNrry 20-21 (1984). Used in this sense, "to imagine a
language is to imagine a whole form of social life." TERRY EAGLETON, LrrERARY THEORY. AN
INTRODUGrION 60 (1983).
91 See Mark V. Tushnet, Foreword, 77 VA. L. REv. 631, 688 (1991) ("[T]he consequence
of Ely's style is to draw readers into his theoretical universe-to attract them.... The style,
therefore, is integral to the success of Ely's enterprise."). Indeed, Tushnet argues that the
primary value of Ely's theory of representation-reinforcing judicial review is precisely its
rhetorical skill in encapsulating for this generation the recurring theme that the Constitu-
tion concerns itself primarily with process, not substantive policy. Id. at 638-39.
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author is engaged."92 Ely's engagement with the constitutional schol-
ars and actors who have preceded him, with the Court, and with the
text of the Constitution itself is palpable.
Perhaps as a result, or as a corollary, the "ideal reader"93 that De-
mocracy and Distrust presupposes includes the full range of predisposi-
tions on the ultimate issue. It does not ask or assume that the reader
already agrees on techniques of constitutional interpretation or sub-
stantive results. Nor does the ideal reader's dialectical partner, the
"model author"-the "voice that speaks to us affectionately (or impe-
riously, or slyly), that wants us beside it 'and is' identified with what
every aesthetic theory calls 'style,'" 94-operate with a series of argu-
mentative conventions indicating that the ideal reader is committed
to a contrary position. By its example, the model author of Democracy
92 James Boyd White, What Can a LaryerLeam from Literature?, 102 HAxv. L. REv. 2014,
2014-15 (1989) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, IAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD
RELATION (1988)). I have inverted the original meaning of this passage by substituting in
brackets the word "a" in place of White's "no."
93 The concept that a text teaches the reader how it ought to be read and hence seeks
to define the character of the relationship between text and reader-personified by an
ideal reader-is the central insight underlying reader response theory.
The reader is also a character in the world created by the text. For in acting
on the reader as he does, the writer calls on him to function out of what he
knows and is-for one who brings nothing to a text cannot be a reader of
it-and to realize some of his possibilities for perception and response, for
making judgments and taking positions. To engage with a text is to be-
come different from what one was. There is a sense in which every text may
be said to define an ideal reader, which it asks its audience to become, or to
approximate, for the moment at least and perhaps forever.
WHITE, supra note 90, at 15; see also EAGLE ON, supra note 90, at 84 ("Every literary text is
built out of a sense of its potential audience, [and] includes an image of whom it is written
for"); cf Susan Mann, Note, The Universe and the Library: A Critique ofJames Boyd White as
Writer and Reader, 41 STAN. L. REv. 959, 978-80 (1989) (challenging White's ideal reader
concept). Umberto Eco conceptualizes the "model reader-a sort of ideal type whom the
text not only foresees as a collaborator but also tries to create." UMBERTO ECO, SIx WALKS
IN THE FrrIONAL WOODS 9 (1994). These literary concepts coexist with the insight that an
argument, either explicitly or, more interestingly, implicitly, asks the reader to accept a
certain character, i.e., to accept the assumptions and attitudes about the world which un-
derlie the argument. Jerry Frug, Argument as Character, 40 STAN L. REv. 869, 872-73 (1988).
94 Eco, supra note 93, at 15. In Eco's theory, and in White's, the character of the
ideal or model reader is determined by the text's interpretive strategy--"a set of instruc-
tions which is given to us [as readers] step by step and which we have to follow when we
decide to act as the model reader"-which is Eco's model author. Id. "[T] he competence
of Model Readers is determined by the kind of genetic imprinting that the text has trans-
mitted to them .... Created with-and imprisoned in-the text, they enjoy as much
freedom as the text is willing to grant them.'" Id. at 16 (quoting Paola Pugliatti, Reader's
Stories Revisited: An Introduction, in Ii lettore: modelli, processi ed effetti dellinterpretazione, 52-53
VS 5-6 (1989)); see also EAGLErON, supra note 90, at 76-78 (discussing various reader-re-
sponse theorists' formulation of the "cues," "codes," "strategies," and "schemata" imbed-
ded in texts for the discovery of empirical readers and the definition of ideal readers);
STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY 71 (1989) (discussing Wolfgang Iser's claim
that texts contain not an objective meaning, but a "set of directions for assembling a mean-
ing, directions [the reader] will carry out in his own way").
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and Distrust strongly invites the reader to open her mind to dialogue
with the text.
Thus, Ely treats the discussion in Democracy and Distrust like an
intellectual journey, testing traditional approaches and examining
anew the assumptions of the system. He assesses the strengths of vary-
ing schools of constitutional interpretation as well as his own motiva-
tions, misgivings, and aspirations.95 The journey leads the reader,
whatever his disposition, to an examination of a deeper order of regu-
larity underlying judicial review. Ely's identification of representation
and process as the proper subjects for judicial review is the synthetic
principle he discerns organizing those disassembled materials. The
process of demolition and construction in which the ideal reader has
participated, however, is an education in itself. The educative process
leaves the reader with a platform from which to judge for himself
whether the reconstitutions of the legal language in which he has par-
ticipated reflect a satisfying culture of argument. Therefore, Democ-
racy and Distrust not only proposes an active but limited democratically
rooted role for the courts, but also illustrates the intellectual and
political character that discourse in such a constitutional community
should exhibit.
Put differently, Democracy and Distrust demonstrates and recom-
mends a character of open dialogue. "[I]n making arguments the
speaker or writer 'show[s] himself to be of a certain character' and
seeks to have his listeners (or readers) identify with that kind of char-
acter."96 Likewise, the character of the relationship between the au-
thor and the reader in the community created in the text-be it good
or bad, equal or manipulative-defines the ideal reader's character in
that textual community.97 The footnotes of Democracy and Distrust,
which openly acknowledge difficulties lurking in Ely's positions,
doubts he had in making them, and positions abandoned upon fur-
ther inquiry, serve both to demonstrate that the model author is can-
did and to suggest an interpretive technique of shared inquiry. It is
socratic in its implication that both parties to the textual community
are open to refutation. The character of the idealized law professor in
dialogue with her class comes to mind as an analogy. More relevant to
the task pursued in Democracy and Distrust, however, is the character of
an appellate judge in dialogue with colleagues. When Ely's rhetorical
effort asks us, the readers, to "'be like me"' in order to "expose and
foster an aspect of our own character, advancing a conception of who
95 This is especially notable in the footnotes. E.g., ELY, DFMocRAcy AND DImusT,
supra note 36, at 102 n.*.
96 Frug, supra note 93, at 872-73 (quoting ARisrOT.e, THE "ART" OF RiIETORIC 1377b
(J.H. Freese trans., 1926)).
97 WirT, supra note 90, at 17-18.
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we consider ourselves to be,"9 8 he asks us to react like an idealized,
socratic judge in open dialogue with herself, her colleagues, and her
legal audience of litigants, other courts, the legislature, and the pub-
lic. This identification seeks a transformation of character.
Ely's rhetorical style performs the substance of his theory ofjudi-
cial review in another way. It demonstrates the character of a success-
ful judicial opinion: open to counter argument and refutation,
rooted in common language and experience, calling upon the public
to be watchful, engaged readers, and respectful of the limits of the
judge's role. The ideal reader is invited to map this model author
onto judicial opinions.99
B. The Complex Voice of War and Responsibility
War and Responsibility's model author is much more complex and
changing than that of Democracy and Distrust. In its three chapters ex-
amining directly disputes about elements of the Indochina War, 0 0
Ely's voice nonetheless demonstrates a similar character of candid in-
quiry. For example, it acknowledges weaknesses in the traditional
congressional arguments-going so far as to find that the Tonkin Gulf
Resolution01 ' was sufficient to legitimize the war in Vietnam itself,10 2
and that the secret war in Laos, although unconstitutional, was practi-
cally unremediable.10 3 Unlike Democracy and Distrust, however, the
model author in these chapters also rings out with the character of a
particularly eloquent expert witness. Ely presents historical facts as he
understands them and offers expert analysis of the theories of his op-
ponents in light of those facts. Rather than shade every fact or infer-
98 Frug, supra note 93, at 873.
99 It has been suggested that this kind of stylistic character in judicial opinions serves
as a guard against substantively defective legal decisions. "No opinion with a misguided
outcome has ever in fact been 'well-crafted.'" Ric ls D WEISBERG, POETmcs AND OTHER
STRATEGIES OF LAW AND LrrAERATURE 7 (1992). This concept is critiqued in John Fischer,
Note, Reading Literature/Reading Law: Is There a Literary Jurisprudene, 72 Tax. L. Rxv. 135,
14448 (1993).
100 ELY, supra note 24, at 12-46, 68-104.
101 Tonkin Gulf Resolution, Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964), repealed by Act of
Jan. 12, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-672, § 12, 84 Stat. 2055 (1971).
102 ELY, supra note 24, at 46-47, 69. Congressional leaders, such as Senator Richard
Russell, recognized the breadth of their authorization: "I knew that the joint resolution
conferred a vast grant of power upon the President. It is written in terms that are not
capable of misinterpretation, and about which it is difficult to become confused.... Per-
sonally, I would be ashamed to say that I did not realize what I was voting for when I voted
for thatjoint resolution." 112 CONG. Rac. 4370-71 (1966) (quoted in TURNER, supranote 4,
at 20) (also citing statements of numerous other congressional leaders); see also ELY, supra
note 24, at 16-19; Gerald R. Ford, Foreword to TURNER, supra note 4, at viii (noting, as a
congressman, "when some of my colleagues began pretending in the early 1970s that Con-
gress had been an innocent bystander as the nation had committed its young men to con-
flict in Southeast Asia, I felt a great sense of sadness").
103 ELY, supra note 24, at 68.
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ence his way, as an advocate might, he maintains a fairly objective
tone, as in his early willingness to concede the basic constitutional
legitimacy of the war in Vietnam. 10 4
Moreover, since the military, political, and legal events surround-
ing the war in Indochina are recent and well known, Ely's model au-
thor also implicitly invites the ideal reader to become a witness to how
the allocation of war powers played out at that time. In reading his
testimony, we can use our remembrance either to rebut his factual
assertions or to assent to them, becoming a corroborating witness.
Although this technique is not necessarily uncommon, most constitu-
tional debate deals with events of much earlier history, interpreting a
body of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century texts and precedent,
rather than testifying to events of recent memory. For example,
whereas the reader can either dispute or agree with Ely's contention
that the public did not know about the war in Laos by reference to her
own experience, she cannot similarly testify as to what happened at
the Constitutional Convention or as to what was publicly known about
the situation in the Philippines from 1896 to 1898. Thus, War and
Responsibility engages the faculties of the reader in a way that most
treatments of the War Clause do not.
The model author of War and Responsibility, however, does not
speak as a witness throughout. The voice of War and Responsibility
shifts dramatically in two chapters: the first, discussing the "Constitu-
tional Framework,"10 5 and the third, entitled "Inducing Congress to
Face Up to Its Constitutional Responsibilities." 10 6 The model author
speaks in these two chapters with a voice of assertive, derisive author-
ity. Why does Ely adopt this tone in order to make these arguments?
As noted above, the necessary premise of Ely's argument-the
unequivocal delegation to Congress of all authority to commence
combat, save in immediate emergencies-is set forth in only three
pages,107 with six pages addressing counterarguments.108 This is star-
tlingly peremptory treatment of topics that form the grist of the sizea-
ble body of war powers scholarship and debate.'0 9
104 Id. at 47.
105 Id. at 3-11.
106 Id. at 47-67. The latter is reproduced bluntly in the. header of the chapter as "In-
ducing Congress to Do Its Job."
107 Id. at 2-5.
1o8 Id. at 5-10.
109 Nonetheless, concentration on this small, opening aspect of Ely's book has led one
reviewer, Professor Philip Bobbitt, to conclude that Ely allowed himself to become "en-
snare[d] ... in the terms of the current debate." Bobbitt, supra note 89, at 1378. Professor
Bobbitt calls the procongressional constitutional framework the "Standard Model," and
criticizes Ely primarily for too quickly assuming in the first chapter that it is valid as a
matter of text, history, prudence, and precedent, while not addressing structural and ethi-
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Moreover, although Chapter One takes issue with the most ag-
gressive arguments for Executive war, it omits discussion or accommo-
dation of the popular middle view that use of force (at least short of
full war) often flows from the conduct of diplomacy, and so lies within
what Justice Jackson termed a "zone of twilight" in which powers are
concurrently held.110 Whereas Democracy and Distrust sought to per-
suade a full spectrum of opinion holders by integrating all the respect-
able theories of judicial review, War and Responsibility does not
similarly seek to integrate or co-opt all positions or reach all the con-
stituencies and viewpoints regarding the war powers. Rather, Chapter
One implies a narrow readership.
Taken as the opening move in the book's longer argument, how-
ever, the opposite is true. As its subtitle suggests and as noted above,
the vast bulk of War and Responsibility submerges the basic question of
the war powers in the shared experience of Vietnam reconstructed in
the text. A lengthy discussion of how Congress chose to use, or mis-
use, its power in this generation and of the effects of that choice sub-
ordinates the necessary premise, congressional supremacy. This
reflects the model author's call to a more broadly conceived ideal
reader: one who will test the author's perceptions and prescriptions
primarily against experience, witnessed (and possibly rebutted) within
the textual community, rather than against the traditional materials of
the debate. This represents a stark departure from the debates about
early precedents that were noted by Justice Jackson in 1951 and that
continue to polarize the debate today.
In Chapter Three, Ely shifts again, unsheathing a poison pen and
taking an acerbic, mocking tone unlike the gentlemanly, conversa-
tional discourse for which he is known. He accuses Congress of hav-
cal arguments. Id. at 1375-88. Bobbitt proposes a middle position on the war powers by
reference to the latter two sources of authority. Id. at 1389-1400.
110 SeeYoungstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring); see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668-69 (1981) (discussed in
MichaelJ. Glennon, The War Powers Resolution Ten Years Later More Politics than Law, 78 Am.
J. INT'L L. 571, 576 (1984)); KYmrs, supra note 30, at 91-94, 117-18 (applyingJusticeJack-
son's test to the invasion of Cambodia in 1970). Compare REvELEY, supra note 4, at 191-95
("Given congressional silence, the President should be constitutionally free to act, limited
only by (1) the necessity to inform the legislators fully of developments on a continuing
basis, (2) defensive purpose, and (3) the availability of implementing tools.") and Sofiaer,
supra note 9, at 324 (arguing that pattern of executive action in foreign affairs, including
hostilities, pending full congressional vote to the contrary, is consistent both with the in-
tended constitutional system and with JusticeJackson's concurrence), with GLENNoN, supra
note 1, at 93; Charles Bennett et al., The Preaident's Powers as Commander-in-Chief Versus Con-
gress' War Power and Appropriations Power, 43 U. MIAMi L. REv. 17, 36-37 (1988) (comments
by Professor William Van Alstyne) and; Biden & Ritch, supra note 4, at 394-97 (arguing that
JusticeJackson's framework provides an opportunity for Congress to legislate a new alloca-
tion of responsibilities) and Kelly, supra note 3, at 151 (arguing that "the judicially created
concept of fluctuating powers" offers Congress the tools to reestablish the "original con-
ceptual model").
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ing entered into a cynical "conspiracy between the executive and
legislative branches to enhance their own political fortunes at the ex-
pense of the interests of the people at large (now more than ever, its
least advantaged segments)."111 This conspiracy seeks to "retain[ ] for
Congress the option (depending on how the war went) of pointing
with pride or viewing with alarm."11 2 "[W]hen things went wrong [in
Vietnam, Congress] could continue to claim mere bystander status.
Who, us? This isn't our war. It's Johnson's war. Or maybe
Nixon's."" 3 An ineluctable urge to keep "the embarrassing monkey
of accountability off their backs"" 4 drives Congress to leave the deci-
sion whether to go to war to the President.
In Ely's view, no amount of exhortation can shake this devotion
to unaccountability in foreign affairs." 5 "Congress' proclivity to hide
on issues of war and peace [is] legendary,"" 6 rendering bootless
scholars' "efforts to stiffen Congress's back."" 7 Even Congress's suc-
cess in deliberating over the invasion of Kuwait provides no grounds
to predict that it will be repeated before the next war: "[T]he predic-
tion probably underestimates Congress's sophistication on the subject
of self-preservation."" 8 Ely foresees a quick
return to the tradition of evasion, a resolve of still greater dogged-
ness in resisting suggestions . . . that casting a vote on whether
Americans are to die might be part of theirjob. The next war might
be another Desert Storm or it might not: better to keep your op-
tions open and claim vindication either way." 9
111 ELY, supra note 24, at 54. Ely states in the preface that the conspiracy involves all
the branches:
It is common to style this shift a usurpation, but that oversimplifies to the
point of misstatement. It's true our Cold War presidents generally wanted
it that way, but Congress (and the courts) ceded the ground without a
fight. ... [T]he legislative surrender was a self-interested one: Accounta-
bility is pretty frightening stuff.
Id. at ix.
112 Id. at 49.
113 Id. at 47. Stated differently, "the president will take the responsibility (well, most of
it) so long as he can make the decisions, and Congress will forego actual policy-making
authority so long as it doesn't have to be held accountable (and can scold the president
when things go wrong)." Id. at 54.
114 Id. at 65-66.
115 See also GLENNON, supra note 1, at 109 ("That Congress has an operative institu-
tional memory is another false assumption" identified by critics as undercutting Congress's
ability to discipline itself.).
116 ELY, supra note 24, at 180 n.82.
117 Id. at 65.
118 Id. at 51-52.
119 Id. at 52.
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Ely derides any suggestion that Congress can be cured by itself, 2 0 by a
President mindful of Congress's proper role,121 or by the
electorate. 22
C. Ely's Audience
We can ask again, why does Ely quickly assume the strongest con-
gressional position in the first chapter and then launch this caustic
attack on Congress and the capacity of our constitutional system to
cure itself? In sharp contrast to Democracy and Distrust, these mocking
accusations certainly do not demonstrate or recommend a public judi-
cial voice appropriate to the proposed circumscribed role of judicial
review.' 2 3
The answer lies in Ely's audience. He speaks not to persuade an
ideal reader with an open mind but to beat down the passive resister.
He seeks to convert and catalyze those who accept the strong congres-
sional position and identify with Congress by lampooning the "tradi-
tion of evasion" forged by the silent majority in Congress. 124 The
lengthy footnotes carry a virtual indictment of the overreaching of
120 Ely analogizes: "Ulysses tried, genuinely I think, to tie himself to the mast in 1973,
but the knots were loose, and he was soon back to his old ways of avoiding responsibility."
Id. at 53.
121 Although President Eisenhower is frequently praised as the last President to take
Congress's role seriously, that example is not held out as a probable candidate for repeti-
tion. Id. at 54, 62.
122 As a sizeable political science literature has documented, congressmen to-
day have found the most comfortable road to survival-and do they ever
survive-to lie in combining a maximum of individual services for constitu-
ents, and other interest groups seen as critical to reelection, with a mini-
mum of actual legislative policy-making.
Id. at 59 (citations omitted). As discussed above, this tendency is particularly remarkable
in the paradigmatically nonlocal topic of foreign affairs. See id. at 175 n.32; see also Kelly,
supra note 3, at 147 (quoted supra note 73).
123 Failure to examine Ely's rhetoric in War and Responsibiity-despite the book's star-
tlingly abrupt changes in tone-has led one reviewer to scold Ely for having "ignored or
conclusorily dismissed the possibility of congressional initiative." Note, The Least Interested
Branch, 107 HIv. L. Rav. 2117, 2122 (1994) (book review). Conversely, since the courts
have "tended -to view questions of war powers as involving substantive policy choices,"
rather than procedural line drawing, the same review criticizes the book's arguments re-
gardingjudicial review as feckless. Id. at 2121. Ignoring the method of Ely's argument, the
reviewer laments Ely's lack of a "realizable plan to make the institutions of government
care about their responsibility to each other and to the constitutional regime." Id. at 2122.
Absent a concrete "plan," the review seems to ask, what benefit can a book on war powers
offer? The answer lies below; War and Responsibility exemplifies and recommends a recon-
stituted language in which the problems can be argued. The book's plan, process-oriented
judicial review, seeks to educate the other branches in this language, but offers no coercive
statutory plan capable of boxing them into a positivist cage. See ELY, supra note 24, at 237-
38 n.61.
124 This is not to say that War and Reaponsibility absolves the Presidency of arrogation of
the war power. It certainly does not. It does, however, self-consciously choose to indict the
other two branches for abetting the Executive's move towards predominance. ELY, supra
note 24, at ix. Ely's emphasis on the self-inflicted nature of Congress's and the courts'
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presidents and the complicity of Congress. 25 This rhetoric of ridi-
cule, much like that more commonly associated with back-benchers in
Britain's Parliament, invites those who hold or influence congres-
sional authority to distance themselves from passive complicity with a
constitutional usurpation and assert congressional initiative.
He also uses ridicule to jar a complacentJudiciary accustomed to
relying on recantation of the principles of democracy to avoid ad-
dressing the allocation of the war powers. These principles invoke
accountability, and call for Congress and the political system to diag-
nose and heal itself, rather than resorting to the unaccountable Judici-
ary for a cure. Therefore, although the questions raised concern the
meaning of a constitutional command, the courts claim, in the name
of democracy, to be justified in neglecting their "province and duty
... to say what the law is. ''"26 In particular, Ely criticizes the judicially
created political question doctrine, as well as narrow notions of con-
gressional standing.127 By juxtaposing the judicial resort to demo-
cratic theory against the history of political hypocrisy surrounding the
Indochina War, and then wringing it through a mocking account of
Congress's "legendary" success in frustrating accountability, Ely at-
tempts to make the easy, habitual rejoinders of the Judiciary unspeak-
able, or at least unpalatable. Committing this question to the political
branches, in Ely's reconstitution, does not enhance accountability and
democracy but rather undermines them. Textual witness to the costs
and hypocrisies of the war in Indochina renders the invocation of
democratic values in favor of abstention hollow. Indeed, any grounds
for abstention, whether based in democratic theory or prudence in
regard to judicial capital, nonetheless will drag the courts into com-
plicity in the evasion of accountability. In the end, Ely invites the Judi-
ciary to either laugh with him at Congress's excuses, or to join the
object of laughter.
From this devastation of the preexisting constitutional language
legitimating presidential initiative (now viewed as congressional "eva-
sion" 28 ) Ely offers both Congress and the courts a new language and
structure of war powers. On the last page of the text, Ely's model
author offers the ideal reader a clue that the rhetoric of war powers is
his point
wounds furthers his attempt to motivate them, rather than simply castigating the
Executive.
125 Id. at 171-74 nn.10-19.
126 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
127 ELY, supra note 24, at 54-60. For a discussion canvassing in detail application of the
political question doctrine and other doctrines of judicial abstention to the war in Indo-
china, see KEvNrs, supra note 80, at 120-60; see also Note, The Least Interested Branch, supra
note 123, at 2120-21.
128 ELY, supra note 24, at 52.
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[W]e would be injecting the judiciary into the process. Rhetoric is
the courts' most powerful weapon. It should be within the capacity
of most federaljudges (certainly within the Supreme Court's capac-
ity) to write an opinion explaining that the Constitution entrusts
the choice between war and peace to the legislative process .... 129
D. Power and Duty
The central term of meaning in Ely's language of war powers is
the newly complicated term "power" in the Constitution's grant of the
"Power... [t]o declare War."130 A typical war powers debate treats
"power" as synonymous with "right," and addresses the question of
whether the President has invaded Congress's right to declare war.131
Justice Jackson in The Steel Seizure Case characterized the allocation of
foreign affairs powers in terms of Congress's power "slipping through
its fingers." 132 Conversely, others ask whether the President has a
right to take the initiative in foreign affairs, including war.' 33 This
traditional use of the term "power" corresponds with the view of the
Constitution as a structure that operates by balancing competing insti-
tutions, counting on them to protect their turf.13 4
Ely complicates this term with the corresponding concept of duty,
which he calls Congress's "job."'35 Congress was granted the power in
order to fulfill a duty-to provide an institutional check against execu-
tive war making and to facilitate a forum for a deliberate, public de-
129 Id. at 130-31. Similarly, the last page of the notes stresses that judicial review, with a
potential remand, offers an "educational process" capable of persuading Congress and the
President to change the current pattern; rather than putting forward judicial remands as
"the way the system typically should work." Id. at 238 n.61.
130 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, CIs. 1, 11.
131 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (It is "'plaintiffs'
Constitutional right, as members of the Congress of the United States, to decide whether
the United States should fight a war'. ... Implicit in [this] contention is the[ ] assumption
that the Constitution gives to the Congress the exclusive right to decide whether the United
States should fight all types of war."); Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 902 (D.D.C.
1982) (discussing "[piresidential usurpation of congressional warmaking power"), afftd,
720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984); 129 CONG.
Rc. 26,286 (1983) (statement of Sen. Heinz) (discussingwar powers in terms of "the Presi-
dent's right to conduct the foreign policy of this Nation and the right of the Congress to
carefully evaluate and approve the commitment of U.S. troops"); Sidak, supra note 30, at
63 ("The Constitution makes initial assignments of property rights in different governmen-
tal functions .. ").
132 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579,
654 (1952) (Jackson, J, concurring).
133 See e.g., Rostow, supra note 9, at 40 (asserting "the President's right to use force
without the prior approval of Congress").
134 Ely operates within this conception arguendo in addressing what he calls an "adverse
possession" theory of how presidential practice has shifted title over the war power from
the Congress to the President. ELY, supra note 24, at 10.
135 Id. at 52.
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bate preceding hostilities.' 36 This job gives meaning to the
constitutional grant, which cannot be waived without damaging the
animating purpose for which the power was delegated.'i 7
Indeed, in the language of "rights-talk," this process vests a corre-
sponding right in the electorate: the democratic right to witness
elected representatives deciding whether to go to war. This is not sim-
ply an empty right to procedure. Many Americans have sacrificed in
unwise presidential wars. Numerous others have paid the price in cov-
ert actions for questionable gains.138 From this right flows a require-
ment of accountability. Congress must do its job clearly and publicly
so that the electorate will have the benefit not only of having wars
carefully contemplated, but of being able to exercise their "right" to
hold their representatives accountable for that decision.
Thus, Ely dismisses the traditional focus of war power debates on
Congress's right to decide as merely the "prerogatives of congress-
men."13 9 This prerogative pales beside the underlying 'judgment that
no single individual should be able to take the nation into war and
thereby risk the lives of all of us, especially our young people."' 0 Af-
136 Professor Bickel performed the same complication in a 1971 lecture. Rather than
concentrating on a process-based judicial check, however, he relied on exhortation to
Congress.
No, the answer lies with Congress. Whatever aggrandizement of presiden-
tial power we have witnessed, the practice of recent decades or of a century
cannot have worked a reduction of the residual legislative power of Con-
gress, if Congress should but exercise it. The power of Congress may have
lain in disuse, but it is as legitimate as the day it was conferred. From it
flows the duty to act.
Bickel, supra note 74, at 145.
137 By reconstituting this pivotal constitutional term, Ely rejects for war powers, and
potentially for all congressional powers, the conception that "constitutional values of 'prin-
ciple' [regarding individuals] do not overlap with issues of federalism or separation of
powers." Sager, supra note 43, at 715.
138 ELy, supra note 24, at 224 n.22. The inherent tendency of covert war to breed an
obsessive secrecy subversive of democratic institutions highlights the importance of the
public's "right" to open congressional participation in the initiation of all wars. See id. at
225 n.23 (discussing historical incidents of national security personnel keeping the nastiest
projects out of sight).
139 Id. at 47; see alsoJohn Hart Ely, Kuwait, the Constitution, and the Courts: Two Cheers for
judge Greene, 8 CONST. CoMMENTARY 1, 6 (1991). Some scholars use a framework of institu-
tional "prerogative" explicitly. E.g., RvEr.L, supra note 4, at 25; Eugene V. Rostow, Presi-
dent, Prime Minister or Constitutional Monarch 7, in FOREIGN AFFAiRS AND THE U.S.
CoNsTrtrrON, supra note 11, at 38. In rejecting, as Ely does, the claim that the power to
declare war is a "proprietary perquisite[ ] of Congress," Professors Wormuth and Firmage
rely too heavily on the thin reed of the nondelegation cases from the early 1930s, as dis-
cussed above. WoRMuTH & FIRmAGE, supra note 30, at 214.
140 ELY, supra note 24, at 47. Ely states:
Dean Choper, following Professor Wechsler, has recently argued that 'sepa-
ration of powers' quarrels between Congress and the president-which ap-
pear to include claims that the executive is acting beyond his authority-
should not bejudicially resolved because the 'put upon' branch can protect
itself politically. ... There is some surface sense in this suggestion: Absent
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ter the shared witness to the human cost of the Indochina War per-
formed in the text, it is difficult for the reader sensibly to contest this
statement. Only a truly detached mind would continue to contend
that solicitude for the democratic process requires tolerance of Con-
gress's indulgence in the anti-democratic urge to avoid accountability
when its cost is measured in the lives of others.
141
The courts, as the authoritative "expounders" of the document
creating Congress's job, are invoked only when the system has broken
down beyond the capacity of politics to fix it. At that impasse "the
assistance of the courts thus appears to have become essential if Con-
gress is to be induced to discharge its constitutional responsibilities in
this area.' 42 The courts intervene on behalf of the electorate whose
"rights" are truly at stake, not in order to protect Congress from itself.
This construction of the constitutional term "power" and the role
of the courts parallels the conception of the Constitution as itself the
equivalent of a trust document:
Such an instrument will typically define with finality and in detail
the property that belongs to the trust, the beneficiaries of the trust,
how long it should run, and so forth. But in its other directions to
the trustee it will normally be very general; he will be able to do with
the property whatever seems appropriate, given the purposes set
forth in the instrument, so long as he acts reasonably and in the
best interests of the beneficiaries.
143
Congress and the President act as executors of the trust created by the
Constitution's ratifiers. The courts' role in expounding the Constitu-
tion is the familiar one of a probate judge: to hold the trustee to the
purposes of the trust and to the duty to administer it in the benefici-
a pretty specific constitutional direction to the contrary, courts should not
intervene to take care of those who can take care of themselves. The argu-
ment doesn't work in this context, however, as the prerogatives of Congress
aren't really what's at stake here.
Id. at 175-76 n.43; see also id. at 57. Compare 140 CONG. REc. H9031 (daily ed. Sept. 12,
1994) (Statement of Rep. Skaggs) ("This is not a turf issue. Having Congress act is a means
to a more important end, and that is making sure that the country understands and sup-
ports such a grave decision [i.e., to invade Haiti]."); KEYNES, supra note 30, at 168 ("The
classical (Marshall-Hamilton-Warren-Wechsler) argument for judicial review suggests that
the courts have a special obligation to limit the legislative and executive branches to the
exercise of their respective constitutional powers.... At the very least, the judiciary has an
obligation to determine whether... a demonstrable commitment [to a particular branch]
exists and to determine the scope of the power .... .").
141 See also Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042 (2d Cir.), cert. dnied, 404 U.S. 869
(1971) ("The constitutional delegation of the war-declaring power to the Congress con-
tains a discoverable and manageable standard imposing on the Congress a duty of mutual
participation in the prosecution of war.").
142 ELY, supra note 24, at 67.
143 WHrrE, supra note 90, at 244.
[Vol. 80:12361264
POWER AND DUTY
ary's, not their own, interests. 44 Similarly, under Ely's conception,
the courts address challenges under the War Clause and are called
upon to protect the rights of the beneficiary, not those of the trustees.
This does not involve the Judiciary administering the trust but rather
monitoring the political branches' actions as trustees to see that they
conform to its procedures and purpose.
There is also a practical litigation benefit to Ely's approach. Con-
trary to the most recentjudicial pronouncement in this area, 45 redefi-
nition of "power" as 'job" logically vitiates any requirement that
Congress as a body petition the courts for redress of a presidential
trespass. That was Judge Greene's approach in Dellums v. Bush, which
dismissed on ripeness grounds a challenge by members of Congress to
President Bush's build-up towards the Persian Gulf War because a ma-
jority of Representatives and Senators had not joined the suit.1 46
Judge Greene's reasoning stems from a proprietary view of constitu-
tional power and is worth repeating in full:
[P]laintiffs in an action of this kind [must] be or represent a major-
ity of the Members of the Congress: the majority of the body that
under the Constitution is the only one competent to declare war,
and therefore also the one with the ability to seek an order from the
courts to prevent anyone else, i.e., the Executive, from in effect de-
claring war. In short, unless the Congress as a whole, or by a major-
ity, is heard from, the controversy here cannot be deemed ripe; it is
only if the majority of the Congress seeks relief from an infringe-
ment on its constitutional war-declaration power that it may be enti-
tled to receive it.' 47
144 See id. at 256 (discussing ChiefJustice Marshall's vision, in McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), of the Court's role in expounding the Constitution); c. 129
CONG. RFc. 26,294 (1983) (statement of Sen. Byrd) ("The people of the United States,
through their votes, invest in us a trust").
145 Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990), discussed in ELY, supra note 24, at
59.
146 Dellums, 752 F. Supp. at 1151. Ripeness, equitable discretion, and the political
question doctrine are closely related. Judge Revercomb dismissed on equitable discretion
and political question grounds a suit by 100 members of the House of Representatives
challenging, under the War Powers Resolution, President Reagan's decision to reflag
Kuwaiti freighters in the Persian Gulf in 1987. He reasoned that "[]udicial review of the
constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution is not, however, precluded by this [political
question] decision. A true confrontation between the Executive and a unified Congress, as
evidenced by its passage of legislation to enforce the Resolution, would pose a question
ripe for judicial review." Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 339 (D.D.C. 1987). Lony,
which rests on prudential rather than constitutional foundations, has been described as
"[a]n open invitation" to rule upon the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution
should it be presented by a unified Congress. Michael M. Uhlmann, Reflections on the Role of
theJudiciay in Foreign Policy, in FOREIGN Poucy AND THE CONsrrruTION, supra note 85, at 52.
For a thorough discussion of congressional standing generally, see Carlin Meyer, Imbalance
of Powers: Can Congressional Lawsuits Seve as Counterweight, 54 U. Prrr. L. REv. 63 (1992).
147 Dellums, 752 F. Supp. at 1151. It is unclear how such a majority must express its
views in Judge Greene's view. However, it is clear that neither a nonbinding resolution by
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In a system in which powers are delegated for the benefit of the insti-
tutions, this holding makes perfect sense.
In Ely's language of duty and accountability, however, the hold-
ing is absurd. Stated in that language, the reasoning becomes: Since
Congress has refused to address the issues of war and peace-depriv-
ing the public of the chance to hold individual members accountable
for their choices and preventing the congressional minority from do-
ing its duty-it is not yet time to examine whether Congress has
evaded its duty. Moreover, only when a majority in Congress has done
its duty by voting to stop a military buildup, or by going to court en
masse, may the court properly reach the issue. In other words, the
issue will not ripen until it is effectively moot. The congressional ma-
jority, therefore, is allowed to shirk its responsibility to protect the
public from ill-considered executive war (the very purpose for which
the power was vested in Congress) until it stops shirking, at which
point it does not really need judicial help. The interests of the public
in procedure and accountability are completely absent as a subject of
judicial concern. War and Responsibility succeeds by bringing those in-
terests into the center of the debate.
CONCLUSION
For the reader who engages with Dean Ely's text, the terms of
evaluation and debate will in the future focus not only on disputes
over the scope and viability of Congress's institutional right (which
looks towards the interests of the right holder), but on the animating
character of Congress's duty towards the people it serves. Ely's pre-
scription, therefore, calls on Members of Congress and the Judiciary
not to protect an institution that will not protect its own prerogatives,
but to hold Congress to its duties to the public. This transformation
of the debate forges rhetorically what the book's title promises: a
bond of accountability between the people who bear the costs of war
and the members of Congress charged with the responsibility for de-
ciding when to send them to fight. The character of Ely's discourse
the majority party in one chamber, nor expressions by the majority leadership, is enough.
Id. at 1151 n.28. Judge Revercomb would have required a joint resolution, as in Louny v.
Reagan. 676 F. Supp. 333,339, 341 (D.D.C. 1987). Compare with Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F.
Supp. 893, 899 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam) ("The
Court need not decide here what type of congressional statement or action would consti-
tute an official congressional stance... because Congress has taken absolutely no action
.... Certainly, were Congress to pass a resolution... and the President disregarded it, a
constitutional impasse appropriate for judicial resolution would be presented.") (citing
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring)). SeeThomas M. Franck,
Rethinking WarPowers, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTIUTION, supra note 11, at 56,
65 (suggesting that Congress set up as a procedural rule a triggering mechanism whereby a
"motion by any ten members of each House" would require an accelerated consideration
of a "resolution of disapproval").
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and the touchstone of accountability it advocates offer an opportunity
to break the continuing stalemate of debate perceived by justice Jack-
son in 1951.
